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Abstract. Since the frequency plan of the Regional Ra-
diocommunication Conference Geneva 2006 has come into
force, many attempts have been made towards its enhance-
ment. The preliminary results, however, seem not to be
compliant with elementary principles of distribution justice.
Therefore, the planning principles which lead to the observed
imbalance will be scrutinized. Furthermore it will be shown
that the utilization of spectrum can be advanced in a balanced
way when the same (necessary) condition for “equitable ac-
cess”, which has been used by a group of middle European
countries for the construction of the original frequency plan,
is applied to plan reﬁnements as well. The necessary condi-
tion mentioned consists simply in the parity of the number of
coverages (constituted of disjoint allotments) conﬁgured in
the plan for each country. In order to be able to plan enhance-
ments, the concept of coverage number has to be generalized
to the case of incomplete coverages of potentially overlap-
ping allotments. The computation of coverage numbers is
straightforward and renders the concept of coverage number
parity a useful tool to be applied as a necessary condition in
testing a frequency plan variant for equitable access.
1 Introduction
During the preparation of the Regional Radiocommunication
Conference 2006 (RRC06) it has been copiously and contro-
versially discussed how a fair distribution of the spectral re-
sources among the participating countries could be achieved
(Puigrefagut, 2004). The report of the ﬁrst Session of the
Regional Radiocommunication Conference 2004 (RRC04),
at least, contains some general remarks in a short paragraph
on “equitable access” (ITU, 2004) as well as a reference to
article 44 of the ITU Constitution (ITU, 1992). Speciﬁc reg-
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ulations, however, have not been formulated. The confer-
ences’ Final Acts (ITU, 2006) neither put equitable access on
record nor otherwise refer to distribution justice. According
to the description of the software that has been programmed
for the RRC06 (O’Leary, 2006), the only principle that has
been made use of in frequency plan synthesis was to meet a
maximum number of coverage requirements while simulta-
neously limiting the interference load. This could have in-
centivized the countries to increase the probability of plan
entries for their own account by ﬂooding the software with
requirements. To avoid an “arms race” in the process of
requirement posting, a group of CEPT countries had been
meeting consecutively with the aim to counteract by coordi-
nated action the deﬁciencies with respect to distribution jus-
tice, which are featured by the ITU planning procedure. The
idea to quantify the degree of equitability by direct compari-
son of the spectral resources used by the countries involved,
however, had to be discarded. On one hand it proved hardly
possible to quantify the consumption of spectrum. On the
other hand, a straight uniform distribution would not even
have been adequate, considering that real coverage require-
ments of neighboring countries can differ appreciably. An
absolute notion of justice would have been helpful, but, as a
matter of principle, cannot be provided in spite of all strenu-
ous efforts of political philosophy. However, there is a way
out in recognizing that absolute justice can be replaced by
what could be called a relative deﬁnition, by accepting a sit-
uation as just when all parties involved reach a consensus
on that (which insight is the constituting element in the fa-
mous theory of J. Rawls (Rawls, 1975)). Thus the countries
eventually agreed on an equal number of coverages as a ba-
sic prerequisite for any fair distribution of spectral resources.
For the sake of veriﬁability, it has been required that the allot-
ments which constitute a nationwide coverage may not over-
lap. The amount of spectrum used for the realization of the
coverages, e.g. the number of channels consumed, deliber-
ately has not been taken into account in the evaluation of
equitable access. Thus it has been facilitated to conﬁgure
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the allotments according to speciﬁc regional needs like inter-
nal administrative borders, speech communities, coherent ar-
eas of communication, topographic constraints, and existing
transmitter networks. Merely, in cases where it was impossi-
ble to meet all requirements along a border with the available
spectrum, the parties involved had to settle on necessary re-
ductions of the requirements. For those countries which have
submitted to this planning principle, the frequency plan, nat-
urally, is completely balanced with regard to the number of
coverages. It is, however, not necessarily balanced with re-
gard to the amount of spectral resources consumed. This cir-
cumstance is of basic importance when it comes to extend-
ing the rights of spectrum usage beyond the Geneva 2006
frequency plan.
2 The traditional approach to further development
The traditional approach to extending the rights of spectrum
usage consists in identifying such possibilities for the imple-
mentation of new channels or transmitters, which preserve
the integrity of the existing plan entries of the neighboring
countries concerned. This is exactly what is implied by “ar-
ticle 4” of ITU (2006), as well as the corresponding regu-
lations in earlier international agreements like e.g. the Final
Acts of the 1984 band II planning conference (ITU, 1984).
In consequence, the parties regard the resources allocated to
them as their property, which they can make use of, rearrange
and optimize quite freely as long as no harm is done to the
resources allocated to the neighbor. Only in cases when ex-
tension potentials of different countries are mutually exclu-
sive, they have to be negotiated. Since the rights of the oth-
ers are preserved in these revisions, it can be stated that the
traditional “article 4” coordination procedures are a matter
of Pareto optimization. However, the achievable gain might
differ considerably between countries, and this is the reason
why the justice of the approach may be duly questioned.
Following the approach, a country can make use of the
more extension possibilities the more resources it has con-
sumed in the construction of the original coverages. Anyone
who has conﬁgured lots of small allotments with individual
frequencies in the original plan, generally, can extend the
frequency usage to the allotments nearby without substan-
tially changing the interference situation in the neighboring
country. Anyone who has succeeded in conﬁguring a small
allotment such that it contains a high-power transmitter as-
signment in the original plan, ordinarily can extend the fre-
quency usage to nearby allotments without doing harm to the
neighboring countries’ rights of spectrum usage, especially
when excess interference is compensated by a reduction of
the radiated power of the primary assignment. On the con-
trary, anyone who has been conservative in the consumption
of spectral resources by conﬁguring comparatively large al-
lotments in the original plan (e.g. to pave the way for the
neighboring country to fulﬁll regional needs by small allot-
ments), ﬁnds himself at a disadvantage: large allotments can-
not, because of self-interference, be enlarged still more, if by
all means the possibility to implement broadcast-type trans-
mitter networks has to be sustained. Thus it is evident that
the bare Pareto principle in the traditional coordination ap-
proach is prone to enhance unjust distribution of resources,
incentivizes countries to misuses like “strategic planning”,
and may give rise to perversions like coordination races.
3 A modiﬁed approach
The unfair consequences of traditional coordination strongly
encourage looking for other (still pareto-optimal) solutions
for the plan enhancement problem which will preserve equi-
table access. The search can be aided by having a look on
the basic ﬂaw of the traditional approach. It consists in aban-
doning in the enhancement process the principle which has
been used to establish an original plan which is regarded as
equitable, the parity of coverage number irrespective of the
amount of allocated resources, and replacing it by the (im-
plicit) principle of ownership of the resources allocated in
the ﬁrst step, which allows to exploit their extension poten-
tials, which have not been taken into account in the equity
assessment of the original plan. From that it can be con-
cluded that for a more balanced plan enhancement procedure
the principle of coverage number parity should be strictly re-
tained and applied also to the extended plan. As immediate
consequence we note that if a country succeeds in freeing
spectral resources by adroit rearrangements, these resources
are no longer owned by that country, but have to be used to
improve the plan of all neighbors concerned in an equitable
way. The fundamental difference to the traditional approach
is that all extension potentials will be distributed equitably,
not the mutually exclusive ones only. Especially it is ensured
that the gain from the release of “hidden assets” will be to
the beneﬁt of all parties concerned.
4 Quantiﬁcation of equitable access
It has been argued that the coverage number parity principle
may constitute a necessary condition for the establishment
of equitable access. However, the potentials for extensions
of the frequency plan do in general not tend to be evenly
distributed geographically. This means that one cannot ex-
pect extensions to again form complete coverages of disjoint
allotments as in the original plan. Hence, the concept of cov-
erage number has to be generalized to the case of incomplete
coverages of potentially overlapping allotments. In doing so
it does not make too much sense to schematically sum up
covered areas. Areas of geometrically equal size may, for
several reasons, not have the same weight in the calculation:
– First of all, areas far from the border should be excluded
from the calculation. If we assume that beyond a certain
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distance D channels can be reused without negative im-
pact on the respective allotments, we ﬁnd that frequen-
cies to be used inside a country a distance D apart from
the borders can be regarded as public goods with respect
to the countries as legal bodies. Such use of frequencies
does not draw on the resources of the other legal bodies
and consequently there is no need for legal restrictions.
Any change in the number of coverages in the inner part
of a country does not affect the possibility of frequency
usageoftheneighboringcountries. Thus, toverifyequi-
table access for a pair of countries, only those areas are
included which consist of points not farther away from
the common border than D. With respect to these areas,
which may be termed the mutual coupling zones, fre-
quencies no longer behave as public goods but as com-
mon public resources instead, the usage of which may
be mutually exclusive.
– Secondly, the total areas of the mutual coupling zones
can differ considerably, as is illustrated by the situation
along the L-shaped borderline between Alsace-Lorraine
in France and Rheinland-Pfalz/Baden in Germany. A
certain channel used in a small allotment in France can
render the same channel unusable in a much larger area
in Germany. A certain channel hypothetically used in
the entire mutual coupling zone of country A with re-
spect to country B will render this channel unusable in
the entire mutual coupling zone of country B with re-
spect to country A. Hence it seems natural to value, re-
spectively, complete coverages of the mutual coupling
zones as equal. In consequence coverages of equal frac-
tions of the coupling zones have to be valued as equal.
– Thirdly, according to different number of inhabitants,
areas, although of the same size, may be of different
economical importance.
– Lastly, thedegreeofrestrictionswhichatransmitternet-
work implementation may be subject to in different ar-
eas might be different.
Altogether, if the interpretation of “equitable access” as “par-
ity of coverage number irrespective of the amount of re-
sources consumed” is to be reﬂected in a quantitative deﬁni-
tionofan“effectivecoveragenumber”, thiscoveragenumber
has to be additive with respect to extensive variables. This
means, for example, that the contribution of two disjoint al-
lotments (with comparable network implementation condi-
tions) to the effective coverage number has to be the same as
that of a single alternative allotment consisting of the union
of the two. This renders the coverage number a linear ex-
pression in inhabitant number and area size. Furthermore,
inhabitants and area sizes have to enter the calculation as rel-
ative values, as fractions of the corresponding values of the
respective mutual coupling zone.
To keep the discussion simple, it will be assumed that
network implementation in all areas of interest is of the same
degree of complexity. This avoids the introduction of “im-
plementation factors” in the expression for the contribution
of allotments to the coverage number. Let
D := minimum reuse distance; the minimum
distance between co-channel allotments
which prevents harmful mutual interfer-
ence; for the UHF part of the Geneva 2006
frequency plan a value of approximately
120km is adequate,
Aij := area size of the coupling zone of country i
with respect to country j,
Nij := number of inhabitants in the coupling zone
of country i with respect to country j,
Aijk := area size of partial area k of coupling zone
Aij; the partial areas k neither have to be
disjoint nor have to constitute a complete
coverage of the coupling zone; the partial
areas are constituted by the nonempty in-
tersections of all allotments in country i
with the coupling zone Aij; if the same
partial area has different frequency alloca-
tions it has to be taken into account sepa-
rately for each allocation,
Nijk := number of inhabitants in partial area
above.
Then the expression:
CAij :=
6kAijk
Aij
(1)
represents the effective number of area coverages in coun-
try i. It may be veriﬁed that CAij reduces to the customary
number of coverages in the coupling zone when the partial
areas are disjoint and carry the same number of frequency
allocations.
Likewise the expression:
CNij :=
6kNijk
Nij
(2)
represents the effective number of coverages of inhabitants
in country i. It also reduces to the customary number of cov-
erages under the conditions given above. With these deﬁ-
nitions, two necessary conditions for equitable access with
respect to country i and j can be formulated:
CAij :=CAji (3)
and
CNij :=CNji (4)
If area coverage and inhabitants coverage is treated inter-
changeably, then for the sake of simplicity the two condi-
tions (3) and (4) could be replaced by the single condition
of equality of a linear combination of the respective area and
inhabitant-coverage numbers.
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5 Application remarks
It is evident that the parity of coverages concept cannot be
used to resolve conﬂicts in coordination negotiations for-
mally. The concept can only be used to rule out a certain
class of “unfair” frequency plans early in the coordination
process. The plans that pass the test may nevertheless not be
acceptable, for example when the local distribution of cov-
erage does not meet the requirements of one of the coun-
tries. Nevertheless, by avoiding at an early stage the pursuit
of planning variants that would not be accepted by one of the
parties, frequency coordination procedures can be consider-
ably “abridged”. The fact that the concept proposed is not
just another variant of Pareto optimization but that it notably
is compliant with John Rawls’ Maximin principle should en-
courage its application in forthcoming international negotia-
tions on frequency usage.
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